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Abstract—In this work, we study the problem of supervisory
control of discrete-event systems (DES) in the presence of attacks
that tamper with inputs and outputs of the plant. We consider
a very general system setup as we focus on both determinis-
tic and nondeterministic plants that we model as finite state
transducers (FSTs); this also covers the conventional approach to
modeling DES as deterministic finite automata. Furthermore, we
cover a wide class of attacks that can nondeterministically add,
remove, or rewrite a sensing and/or actuation word to any word
from predefined regular languages, and show how such attacks
can be modeled by nondeterministic FSTs; we also present how
the use of FSTs facilitates modeling realistic (and very complex)
attacks, as well as provides the foundation for design of attack-
resilient supervisory controllers. Specifically, we first consider the
supervisory control problem for deterministic plants with attacks
(i) only on their sensors, (ii) only on their actuators, and (iii) both
on their sensors and actuators. For each case, we develop new
conditions for controllability in the presence of attacks, as well
as synthesizing algorithms to obtain FST-based description of
such attack-resilient supervisors. A derived resilient controller
provides a set of all safe control words that can keep the plant
work desirably even in the presence of corrupted observation
and/or if the control words are subjected to actuation attacks.
Then, we extend the controllability theorems and the supervisor
synthesizing algorithms to nondeterministic plants that satisfy a
nonblocking condition. Finally, we illustrate applicability of our
methodology on several examples and numerical case-studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security has been an major concern in many Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) domains, such as autonomous systems [29, 25],
smart grid [5], medical devices [14], industrial automation [9,
7], and distributed control systems [36]. In contested scenarios,
several components of such systems including the controllers,
the plants and their physical environment, as well as com-
munication between system components, may be subject to
simultaneous cyber and/or physical attacks. To allow for the
development of security-critical CPS capable of operating even
in the presence of malicious activity, there has recently been
an effort of developing theory and tools for analyzing and syn-
thesizing attack-resilient CPS (e.g., see [33, 18, 24, 10, 26, 15]
and references therein). The goal has been to provide strong
performance guarantees for CPS using partial knowledge about
the possible attacks [11, 3], as opposed to simple tolerance of
random failures or robustness under small disturbances.
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In this work, we tackle the attack-resilient CPS problem
from the prospective of the supervisory control of discrete-
event systems [6], where the behavior of a discrete-time
finite-state plant is controlled by a supervisor in closed-loop.
Between the plant and the supervisor, we consider a wide class
of regular-rewriting attacks that can compromise the sensors
and actuators of the plant, as well as their communication with
the supervisor. These attackers have the ability to inject, delete,
and replace events/symbols according to certain prespecified
rules. Such attack model generalizes the attacks studied previ-
ously in the context of discrete-event systems [35, 32, 12, 4],
as well as captures new attacks which were previously not
considered in such context (e.g., replay attacks [19, 18]).
Mathematically, the regularly-rewriting attacks define a reg-
ular relation between the input and output languages of the
attackers [28, 8], and can be compactly realized by finite
state transducers (FSTs) or nondeterministic Mealy machines.
These finite-state models, especially deterministic ones, have
found applications in a wide-range of application domains,
such as applications in speech recognition [20, 23, 21, 22]. In
this work, we exploit the nondeterminism in FSTs, which is
crucial in capturing possible attacker behaviors, as well as
design resilient control for all cases (including the worst-case).
Another advantage of using FSTs to model attacks is the
availability of a library of mathematically rigorous and com-
putationally feasible operations. For example, FSTs are closed
under inversion and composition. Thus, complex system con-
figurations and multiple attack-points/attackers can usually be
simplified to a few basic configurations. Furthermore, as we
show in this work, modeling the attackers as FSTs facilitates
capturing of constraints imposed on the attacker by the system
design and underlying platform, such as how frequently attacks
may be enabled when security primitives (e.g., message au-
thentication) are only intermittently employed, as in [15, 16].
Besides its focus on attack-resiliency, this work differs from
the conventional supervisory control of deterministic discrete-
event systems (DES) with uncontrollable and unobservable
symbols in the following two aspects. First, we consider a
more general supervisor model, where we model the super-
visor also as an FST; note that this also covers supervisor
modeling as automata, which is more a conventional approach
for DES. This gives the supervisor the ability to rewrite, in
addition to regulating, in order to counter the attacks and
improve system resiliency; as will be discussed (in Section V),
conventionally supervisors may be feeble under some regular-
rewriting attacks. In addition, we consider a more general class
of plants modeled by FSTs instead of deterministic automata.
FSTs can generate output symbols nondeterministically from
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2predefined regular languages upon receiving a possibly-empty
input word, instead of simply dropping unobservable symbols
and autonomously triggering uncontrollable symbols, and are
more versatile in modeling plants with complex actuating and
sensing architectures.
As illustrated by Figure 1, we are mainly concerned with
three configurations, covering attacks on sensors and/or ac-
tuators of the plant. They capture most forms of malicious
activity in CPS, possibly resulting from network-based attacks
that corrupt the data communicated between the plant and
supervisor (e.g., as in [31, 33]), as well as non-invasive attacks
that affect the environment of the plant (e.g., such as GPS
spoofing attacks on autonomous vehicles [27, 38] or Anti-
lock Braking Systems (ABS) in cars [30]). To simplify our
presentation, even if only the communication between sensors
and/or actuators and the supervisor is compromised, and not
sensors (actuators) themselves, if a sensor’s (actuator’s) infor-
mation delivered to (from) the supervisor is compromised, we
will refer to the sensor (actuator) as being under attack.
By attack-resilient supervisory control we refer to a supervi-
sor that even in the presence of attacks is able to constraint the
behavior of the controlled plant to a set of desired ones; such
desired behaviors are specified as a regular language. Specifi-
cally, our focus is on deriving conditions for attack-resiliency,
which we capture as conditions for controllability under attack,
as well as methods to design such attack-resilient supervisors.
Compared to existing studies on supervisory control of DES in
the presence of attacks [35, 32, 12, 4], this work is different in
the following three aspects. First, we consider a more general
class of attacks modeled by FSTs than the replacement-
removal and the injection-deletion attacks in [35], actuator
enabling/disabling and sensor erasure/injection attacks in [4],
and the replacement by bounded length attack in [32]. We
show how additional attacks can be modeled as FSTs, as
well as how FSTs allow for capturing more complex attack
scenarios. For example, consider coordinated attacks on sen-
sors or actuators of the plant, or the communication network,
capturing different ‘point-of-entry’ for the attack vectors –
e.g., false data injection via sensor spoofing on part of plant
sensors [34, 29] in addition to Denial-of-Service attacks on
transmitted measurements from other sensors. In such cases,
while each attack may be modeled by an individual FST,
the coordinated attacks from multiple attack points shown in
Figure 1 can be captured by composition of such attack FSTs.
Second, the fact that supervisor is also modeled by FSTs, is
giving it the extra ability to rewrite. These supervisors generate
control words that can keep the plant work desirably from
potentially corrupted observations from the plant, even if these
control words are subject to actuation attacks. Note that the
execution of the supervisors is possibly nondeterministic for a
given observation, yielding the set of all feasible control words
under that observation. Consequently, controllability theorems
different from [35, 32, 12, 4] are derived.
Third, both attacks on the sensors and actuators of the plant
are considered simultaneously, while [35] only studies attacks
on the output, and [4] considers attacks on the sensors and
actuators individually. Finally, we consider a more general
class of plants modeled by nondeterministic FSTs instead of
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Fig. 1: Supervisory control under attacks on sensors, actuators
as well as the communication between the sensors, controller
and actuators. In this work, we propose the use of finite-state
transducers to capture a very general class of such attacks.
deterministic automata with uncontrollable and unobservable
symbols as in [35, 32, 12, 4].
In this work, we introduce a new set of controllability
conditions and synthesizing algorithms for attack-resilient
supervisors used for supervisory control of DES where attacks
are modeled by FSTs. For actuator attacks, the controllability
theorem derived here generalizes the standard controllability
theorem [6]. As opposed to previous studies [6, 35, 32, 4],
we show that when using FSTs as the supervisor, the design
can be performed separately for actuator and sensor attacks.
In addition, we show that sensor attacks have no effect on the
controllability of desired languages for deterministic plants,
even in the presence of actuator attacks. This is caused by
the fact that the supervisor is model-based and can encode
a copy of the plant’s model into the control policy, unlike
traditional supervisors that can only allow/disallow symbols.
For nondeterministic plants, however, we show that the sensor
attacks may influence the controllability by blocking control
words of the supervisor.
To highlight impacts of different attack points, we present
our results progressively by considering first the supervisory
control problem for deterministic plants with (i) attacks only
on their sensors, (ii) attacks only on their actuators, and
(iii) attacks on both the sensors and actuators For deterministic
plants, we show that sensor attacks can be countered by a
supervisor derived by the serial composition of the inversion of
the attack model and a model of the desired language. Actuator
attacks on deterministic plants can be partly countered by the
supervisor serially composing a model of the desired language
and the inversion of the attacker. The exact controllability
is achieved if the desired language is invariant under the
attack. For simultaneous sensor and actuator attacks, an attack-
resilient supervisor can be derived by serially composing
the supervisors for the above two cases. Finally, we extend
the results for deterministic plants, to cover scenarios with
nondeterministic plants, under nonblocking conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The prelimi-
naries are provided in Section II. The considered system model
and problem formulation are presented in Section III. Using
FSTs to model attacks is demonstrated in Section IV. We
study the supervisor control problem for deterministic plants
in the presence of only sensor attacks in Section V, with only
actuator attacks in Section VI, and in the presence of both
3sensor and actuator attacks in Section VII. In Section VIII,
we present extension of these results when nondeterministic
plants are considered. Finally, we illustrate applicability of our
attack-resilient supervisory control framework in Section IX,
before providing concluding remarks in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The empty string is denoted by ε. A finite-length sequence
of symbols taken from a given finite set is called a word. A set
of words is called a language of the symbols. The cardinality
and the power set of a set I are denoted by |I| and 2I,
respectively. For two sets I and O, let I\O = {i ∈ I | i /∈ O}.
For n ∈ N, where N is the set of natural numbers, let
[n] = {1, .., n}. For a word I = i1i2 . . . in, we call i1i2 . . . ik,
with k ≤ n, a prefix of I . For a language L, its prefix-closure is
defined by L =
{
I | I is a prefix of J, J ∈ L}. The language
L is prefix-closed if L = L. Also, we adopt the following
convention on generating regular expressions: a superscript ∗
means repeating a symbol or a set of symbols finitely many
times, and a comma means “or”.
A relation R between two sets I and O is a set R ⊆ I×O.
For i ∈ I, let R(i) = R(i, ·) = {o ∈ O | (i, o) ∈ R}. The
relation R(i) is a partial function for the input a if |R(i)| ≤ 1,
for any i ∈ I. More generally, for I′ ⊆ I, while slightly abusing
the notation we define R(I′) = R(I′, ·) = {o ∈ O | (i′, o) ∈
R, i′ ∈ I′}. Thus, R(·) defines a function 2I → 2O. For
relationR ⊆ I×O, its inversion is defined byR−1 = {(o, i) ∈
O× I | (i, o) ∈ R}. Finally, for two relations R ⊆ I×O and
R′ ⊆ I′×O′, their (serial) composition is defined by R◦R′ ={
(i, o′) ∈ I×O′ | ∃o ∈ O ∩ I′ : (i, o) ∈ R ∧ (i′, o′) ∈ R′}.
A. Finite State Transducers and Regular Relations
Finite State Transducers extend (nondeterministic) automata
by generating a sequence of outputs nondeterministically dur-
ing execution, by augmenting each transition with output.
Definition 1 (Finite State Transducer). A (normalized) finite
state transducer (FST) is a tuple A = (S, sinit, I,O,Trans,
Sfinal) where
• S is a finite set of states;
• sinit ∈ S is the initial state;
• I is a finite set of inputs;
• O is a finite set of outputs;
• Trans ⊆ S × (I ∪ {ε}) × (O ∪ {ε}) × S is a transition
relation;
• Sfinal ⊆ S is a finite set of final states.
The FST is deterministic if Trans(s, i, ·, ·) is a partial function
for the input (s, i). Specially, nondeterministic automata are
treated as special FSTs with identical input and output.
A sequence (sinit, i1, o1, s1)(s1, i2, o2, s2)...(sn−1, in, on, sn)
is called an execution of the FST A, if (si−1, ii, oi, si) ⊆ Trans
for i ∈ [n], with s0 = sinit. Note that this defines a regular
relationRA modeled by the FSTA by lettingRA only contain
such pairs of (i1 . . . in, o1 . . . on). On the other hand, a relation
R ⊆ I∗×O∗ is regular, only if it is modeled by FSTs. Finally,
the input language and output language of A are defined by
Lin(A) = R−1A (O∗) and Lout(A) = RA(I∗), respectively.
Attacker Aa
Plant P
Attacker As
Supervisor S
Fig. 2: Controllability under actuator and sensor attacks.
Remark 1 (Normalization). The expressiveness of normalized
FSTs is the same as general FSTs, whose transitions are
labeled by regular languages of the input and output symbols.
For a general FST, we can always find a normalized FST
modeling the same regular relation by normalization [13, 22].
Remark 2 (Complexity). Normalized FSTs can be viewed as
nondeterministic automata with labels in (I∪{ε})×(O∪{ε}).
Accordingly, a regular relation on I∗ × O∗ can be viewed
as a regular language of I ×O. Roughly, the computational
complexity for FST is the same as nondeterministic automata
with exceptions such as determinization of FSTs [8].
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, we consider the problem of supervisory control
of discrete event systems subject to attacks both on the plant’s
sensors and actuators. Specifically, we focus on the setup
illustrated in Figure 2, where the supervisor S controls the
behavior of the plant P by observing the symbols that the
plant generates and then sending the possible control symbols
back to the plant. Physically, this is usually performed by a
number of sensors and actuators on the plant. In reality, these
sensors and actuators, as well as their communication with the
supervisor, may be simultaneously compromised by multiple
coordinated malicious attacks that have the ability of inject,
remove, or replace symbols in both the control (i.e., actuation
commands) and the observation (i.e., sensor measurements).
The overall effects of these attacks can be represented by
two attackers Aa and As on the actuators and sensors of
the plant, respectively. The first challenge that needs to be
addressed is a suitable model that can capture attacker’s impact
on the system. In this work, we propose to model the attack
behaviors Aa and As as FSTs. With FTSs, Aa and As can
regularly rewrite an acceptable word, i.e., replace a symbol
nondeterministically with an arbitrary word taken from some
predefined regular language, including injection, replacement
and deletion; in Section IV we show how this allow us to
capture all reported attacks on supervisory-control systems.
It is important to highlight that we do not assume to know
what actions the attacker may perform. Rather, the FST models
employ nondeterminism to capture all possible actions of the
attacker for a specific set of compromised resources (e.g.,
sensors, actuators), as well as all potential limitations imposed
on the attacker’s actions by the system design (e.g., the use of
cryptographic primitives on some communication messages to
prevent false-data injecting attacks over the network).
Furthermore, we consider systems where the supervisor’s
behavior can also be captured by an FST, since the power
of rewriting symbols is essential to counter the attacks and
40
1
2
3
i1|i3
i1|i3
i2|i3
i3|i3
Fig. 3: Example of a nondeterministic plant.
improve system resiliency. The supervisor receives possibly
corrupted observations (i.e., sensor measurements) from the
plant, and generates control words (i.e., actuation commands)
that can keep the plant work desirably even if the system is
subject to actuation attacks. In addition, we do not restrict
the supervisor’s models to deterministic FST; the execution of
the supervisor can be nondeterministic for a given corrupted
observation, yielding the set of all such safe control words
under that observation. In implementation, the nondeterminism
in the supervisors can be eliminated by choosing one of
the feasible controls either arbitrarily or by certain merit
(see Remark 4). Note that modeling supervisors with FSTs
generalizes the models used for conventional supervisors for
DES that only regulate the plant [6, 35, 32, 4, 37], as FSTs
can be used to model.
Finally, we also assume that the plant can be modeled
as an FST where the output can be nondeterministic and
different from the input. Using such FSTs to model the plants
generalizes deterministic automata that are traditionally used
to model DES; FSTs are versatile in modeling discrete plants
with complex actuating and sensing architectures, compared
to conventional plant models as deterministic automata that
simply drop unobservable symbols and autonomously trigger
uncontrollable symbols.
To simplify our discussion, without lost of generality, we
assume that the supervisor, plant, and attackers share the same
set of symbols for both their inputs and outputs. The closed-
loop system shown in Figure 2 is driven and clocked by the
transitions of the plant — at each time instance, the plant
sends a fragment of symbols as output, which is subject to the
nondeterministic revisions by the attacker and the supervisor,
before returning to the input of the plant. Then, the plant makes
state transitions according to the pair of input and output,
which we assume are always allowed by the model of the
plant and will be discussed later in details, and start the next
round. The plant can stop upon entering a final state.
The nondeterminism in the plant brings an extra challenge
for supervisory control. When the plant is deterministic, the
control can be executed without blocking. However, blocking
may happen in nondeterministic plants. For example, consider
the nondeterministic plant shown in Figure 3 and the desired
control i1i2. The plant may transit from the state 0 to the state
2 upon receiving i1, thus blocking the next symbol i2. We will
discuss this issue in detail in Section VIII.
A. Problem Formulation
We consider the problem of designing a supervisor S that
constraints the behavior of the plant P to certain desired ones,
even in the presence of malicious activity on the plant sensors
and actuators, captured by the FSTs As and Aa. The desired
behavior can be suitably described by a desired regular lan-
guageK ⊆ Lin(P), as formally stated in Definition 2. Specif-
ically, our goal is to develop conditions for resiliency against
attacks, which are captured as conditions for controllability
in the presence of attacks, as well as methods to synthesize
such supervisors. Note that these controllability conditions and
supervisor synthesizing algorithms extend to nondeterministic
plants with an additional nonblocking condition, and will be
discussed in Section VIII.
Definition 2. The supervisor S weakly controls the determin-
istic plant P to the desired language K , in the presence of
actuator and sensor attacks Aa and As if it holds that
K ⊆min Lin(P|S,Aa,As). (1)
Here, Lin(P|S,Aa,As) denotes the language passed to the
input of P in the closed-loop system with both actuator and
sensor attacks, while ⊆min stands for minimal inclusion –
i.e., any supervisor S ′ with K ⊆ Lin(P|S ′,Aa,As) satisfies
Lin(P|S,Aa,As) ⊆ Lin(P|S ′,Aa,As). Furthermore, we say
that the supervisor controls the plant P to the desired language
K when the equality in (1) holds.
The languages passed to the input of P in the closed-
loop setup with only actuator or sensor attacks are de-
noted by Lin(P|S,Aa) and Lin(P|S,As), respectively. Both
controllability and weak controllability for these cases are
similarly defined.
To simplify our presentation, we make the following as-
sumptions (e.g., as in [6, 35, 32, 4, 37], For the plant P , all
states are final Sfinal = S, i.e., both the sets of their inputs and
outputs are prefix-closed. Accordingly, the desired language
K is also prefix-closed K = K¯ and regular. Furthermore,
we assume that in the considered setup from Figure 2, the
FSTs Aa,As,S, and P always receive acceptable inputs1
– i.e., the attackers Aa and As only try to affect/break
the supervisory control by generating undesired instead of
unacceptable words to the plant. Note that this is generally
achievable with the proper use of FST models for the attacks
Aa and As, and the supervisor S (as we show in Section IV).
IV. MODELING ATTACKS WITH FINITE STATE
TRANSDUCERS
In this section, we discuss several issues related to modeling
attacks with FSTs and show how they generalize all existing
attack models. Specifically, we show how FSTs can be used
to capture all previously reported attacks on control of DES,
as well as additional attacks and attack features. For example,
FSTs can be used to capture constraints imposed on the attacks
by the system design, as well as model finite-memory replay
attacks, where the attacker records a finite-length of symbols
and replays it repeatedly [19]; note however, that capturing
replay attacks without a memory constraint (i.e., with infinite
memory) is beyond the capability of the FST formalism.
1This is formally captured as Assumptions 1 and 2 in Sections V and VI,
respectively.
5A. Examples of Attack Modeling using FSTs
One of the contribution of this work is to propose the use of
FSTs to model attacks in the supervisor control of DES. Thus,
we start by showing that attack models proposed in previous
works [35, 4] can be also represented by FSTs as shown in
the following examples.
Example 1 (Projection/Deletion/Injection Attack). Let I′ ⊆ I.
The projection attack defined as
ProjectI′(i) =
{
i, if i ∈ I′
ε, otherwise,
(2)
captures attacker’s actions that result in removing all symbols
that belong to I\I′. On the other hand, the (nondeterministic)
deletion attack defined as
DeleteI′(i) =
{
i, if i ∈ I′
ε or i, otherwise,
(3)
extends the ProjectI′ attack as it captures that the attacker
may (or may not) remove symbols from I\I′; e.g., if I′ = I this
model can be used to capture Denial-of-Service attacks [39]
over the communication network. Finally, the (nondeterminis-
tic) injection attack defined as
InjectI′(i) = (I
′)∗i(I′)∗ (4)
captures that a finite number of symbols from I′ can be
added before and/or after the symbols. These attacks can be
represented by FSTs as shown in Figure 4a, Figure 4b and
Figure 4c, respectively.
Example 2 (Replacement-removal Attack). A replacement-
removal attack defined by the replacing-removing rule φ : I→
2I∪{ε} is represented by an FST as shown in Figure 4d.
Example 3 (Injection-removal Attack). Let I′ ⊆ I. An
injection-removal attack nondeterministically injects or re-
moves symbols in I′ from a word. This is modeled by the
FST in Figure 4e.
Example 4 (Finite-Memory Replay Attack). For systems with
continuous-state dynamics, replay attacks have been modeled
and studied in e.g., [17, 18]. On the other hand, for DES no
such models have been introduced. In DES, a replay attack
records a prefix of a word and replaces the rest with the
repetitions of the recorded prefix, with the prefix size being
bounded by the finite-memory capacity (i.e., size) N . For
example, a replay attack recording a prefix of length up to
N = 2 for any word of symbols I = {i1, i2} can be modeled
by an FST as shown in Figure 4f. Note that the FST can
be viewed as the parallel composition of two replay attacks
recording prefixes of length 1 and 2, respectively.
B. Composition of Finite State Transducers
One of the main advantages of using FSTs to model attacks
on DES is their natural support for composition of multiple
attacks that are captured with the corresponding FST models.
With the general architecture from Figure 1, the system may be
under a coordinated attack from multiple deployed attackers,
i|ε for i ∈ I\I′
i|i for i ∈ I′
(a) Projection Attack
i|ε for i ∈ I\I′
i|i for i ∈ I
(b) Deletion Attack
ε|i for i ∈ I′
i|i for i ∈ I
(c) Injection Attack
i|φ(i) for i ∈ I
(d) Replacement-Removal
Attack
i|ε for i ∈ I′
ε|i for i ∈ I′
i|i for i ∈ I\I′
(e) Injection-Removal
Attack
i1|i1
i2|i2
i1|i1
i2|i2
i1, i2|i1
i1, i2|i2
i1|i1
i2|i2
i2|i2
i1|i1
i1, i2|i1
i1, i2|i2
i1, i2|i1i1, i2|i2
(f) Replay Attack
Fig. 4: FST realizations of different attack models.
capturing different ‘point-of-entries’ for the attack vectors on
sensors/actuators and communication network – e.g., false data
injection via sensor spoofing on part of plant sensors [34, 29]
in coordination with Denial-of-Service attacks on transmitted
measurements from other sensors. This attack configurations
are illustrated in Figure 5a, and the overall effect is equivalent
to the serial composition A1◦. . .◦An. In addition, the attacker
may decide on using a specific attack vector from a set of
available attacks {A1, . . . ,An} as studied in [35], e.g., when
the attacker’s constraints limit the number simultaneously
active malicious components. Such attack configuration is
illustrated in Figure 5b, and the overall effect can be captured
using the parallel composition A1‖ . . . ‖An.
1) Serial Composition: Two normalized FSTs A = (S,
sinit, I,O,Trans,Sfinal) and A′ = (S′, s′init, I′,O′,Trans′,
S′final) can be serially composed to A′′ = A ◦ A′ if I′ = O
by taking the output of A as the input of A′.2 Generally, the
composed FST is derived by (i) taking the Cartesian product
of the states and transitions, (ii) contracting the transitions on
which the output of the first component is identical to the input
of the second component, as well as (iii) keeping transitions
with ε output in A and ε input in A′, while discarding the
others; this is captured in Algorithm 1. Specially, FSTs can
be composed with DESs by treating each DES as an FST with
identical inputs and outputs.
2The serial composition is also done for I′ 6= O by neglecting the symbols
not in I′ ∩O. Still, to simplify our presentation we assume that I′ = O.
6A1 . . . An
(a) Serial Composition
. . .
A1
An
(b) Parallel Composition
A′ A′
A
D D
E
(c) Modeling a frequency constraint imposed
on the attacker
Fig. 5: Composition of FSTs and attack constraints modeling.
Algorithm 1 Composition of Normalized FSTs
Require: Normalized FSTs A = (S, sinit, I,O,Trans,Sfinal)
1: and A′ = (S′, s′init,O,O′,Trans′,S′final)
2: Let A′′ = A ◦ A′ = (S× S′, (sinit, s′init), I,O′, ∅,Sfinal ×
S′final).
3: Add transition ((s1, s′1), i, o
′, (s2, s′2)) to A′′ if there exists
o ∈ O such that (s1, i, o, s2) ∈ Trans and (s′1, o, o′, s′2) ∈
Trans′.
4: Add transition ((s1, s′), i, ε, (s2, s′)) to A′′ for any
(s1, i, ε, s2) ∈ Trans and any s′ ∈ S′.
5: Add transition ((s, s′1), ε, o, (s, s
′
2)) to A′′ for any
(s′1, ε, o, s
′
2) ∈ Trans′ and any s ∈ S.
6: return A′′
Finally, it is worth noting also that Algorithm 1 provides
an FST realization for composition of regular relations RA1 ◦
RA2 = RA1◦A2 , and shows the closeness of regular relations
under serial composition.
2) Parallel Composition: Two normalized FSTs
A = (S, sinit, I,O,Trans,Sfinal) and A′ = (S′, s′init, I′,
O′,Trans′,S′final) can be composed in parallel to A′′ = A‖A′
if I′ = I and O′ = O.3 The composed FST is derived by
(i) taking the union of the states, final states and transitions,
and (ii) adding a new starting state with transitions ε/ε to
the initial states sinit and s′init. The detailed algorithm can be
found in [13, 22] and is omitted here.
Example 5 (Serial Composition). Consider two FSTs A1 and
A2, illustrated in Figures 6a and 6b, where one replaces i1
with i2, and the other injects i3. The composition of the FSTs
derived using Algorithm 1 is presented in Figure 6c. It is easy
to check that RA1◦A2 = RA1 ◦ RA2 .
C. Modeling Constraints on Attackers
Another advantage of using FSTs for attack modeling is
that they facilitate capturing of attack constraints that are
imposed by the underlying platform. For instance, in some
3The parallel composition is also possible for I,O 6= I′,O′.
0 1
i1|i2
i1|ε
(a) FST A1
0 1
ε|i3
i2|i1
(b) FST A2
00 10
01 11
i1|i1
i1|ε
i1|ε
ε|i3 ε|i3
(c) Serial composition A1 ◦A2
Fig. 6: Example of composition of FSTs.
networked control systems, cryptographic primitives (e.g.,
Message Authentication Codes – MACs) can only be in-
termittently used due to resource constraints, and thus only
intermittently preventing injection (i.e., injection) attacks from
occurring [15, 16]. FSTs can be used to model such restrictions
specified as counting or frequency constraints imposed on the
attacker – e.g., allowing an attack to occur at most a certain
number of times f within every window of size l [15, 16] or
as studied in [32].
For an FST A = (S, sinit, I,O,Trans,Sfinal), let A′ =
(S, sinit, I,Trans,Sfinal) be the automaton derived from A by
removing the output symbols of A. Namely, A′ accepts the
same language as A, but does not revise. It accepts the same
input language as A without rewriting. Let F be a frequency
counter modeled by a automaton. For example, the automaton
in Figure 5c with transitions drawn in dotted lines constraints
the attack frequency to once every three steps. The symbols
D/E in Figure 5c stands for attack disabling and enabling.
An attack with frequency constraint is derived by combining
the frequency counter F with A and A′ into a new FST
as shown in Figure 5c. Each transition with label D/E is
replaced by a connection to A′/A, respectively. Note that for
the resulting FST from Figure 5c, the transitions in solid lines
are labeled by ε|ε, namely, they are automatically triggered
without generating any output symbol.
Remark 3 (Relationship with existing work). The problem
considered in this work generalizes previously investigated
problems. To show this, let us assume the plant to be a
deterministic finite state automaton. By specifying suitable
models of actuator and sensor attacks, several previous prob-
lem formulations can be derived as follows:
(i) Let the actuator attack model A(s)a = InjectIuc ◦ P be
the serial composition of the injection attack from (4)
and the plant. These injected symbols are acceptable
symbols of the plant, but not uncontrollable by the
supervisor. In addition, let the sensor attack model
satisfy A(s)s = ProjectIo from (2). The removed symbols
can be viewed as the unobservable symbols generated
by the plant. Such scenario results in the standard (i.e.,
without taking security/attacks into account) supervisory
control formulation [6] with uncontrollable events Iuc,
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(ii) Let the actuator attack be modeled as the serial com-
position A(ed)a ◦ A(s)a , where A(s)a is defined as in
(i) and A(ed)a is the injection-removal attack on a set
of vulnerable control symbols from Example 3. Such
scenario results in the problem of supervisory con-
trol under the actuator enablement/disablement attacks
which was studied in [4]. Similarly, if the sensor attack
is A(ed)s ◦A(s)s , with A(s)s defined as in (i) and A(ed)s is
the injection-removal attack on a set of vulnerable plant
output symbols, then the problem considered in this work
results in the problem of supervisory control under the
sensor enablement/disablement attack problem from [4].
(iii) Let the sensor attack be A(rr)s ◦ A(s)s where A(s)s is
defined as in (i) and A(rr)s is the replacement-removal
attack from Example 2. In this case, our problem formu-
lation results in the problem of supervisory control under
replacement-removal attack from [35]. Similarly, adding
a sensor attack module of injection-deletion attack from
Example 3 yields the problem of supervisory control
under injection-deletion sensor attacks studied in [35].
V. CONTROLLABILITY UNDER SENSOR ATTACKS
In Sections V to VII, we study the supervisory control of
FST-modeled deterministic plants in the presence of attacks.
Specifically, we start by considering resiliency (i.e., control-
lability) under sensor attacks in this section. We consider
the setup from Figure 2 without Aa, where the sensors
symbols are under the attack modeled as As before they are
received by the supervisor S. At first glance, this looks like a
trivial question — the supervisor can simply be the automata
generating the desired language K . As the words generated
by the supervisor are directly sent to the plant, the plant is
guaranteed to execute exactly words in K .
However, when the attacker As may compromise sensor
measurements, and assuming that the supervisor S can only
be automata, then it is generally impossible to close the loop
between the sensors of the plant to the input to the supervisor
as illustrated in the following example.
Example 6. Following the architecture from Figure 2 without
Aa, consider a set of symbols I = {i1, i2} and a plant P
accepting the language (i1, i2)∗, as shown in Figure 7a. The
(prefix-closed) desired language is K = (i1i2)∗, represented
by a discrete event systemMK as shown in Figure 7c. Finally,
let us assume that the attack on sensors As is represented by
the FST from Figure 7b.
In this case, supervising the plant without the ability to
revise symbols is impossible, as the output of the supervisor
should be the desired the language (i1, i2)∗, but the input is
always i∗1, as the plant only generates i
∗
2 and the attacker
rewrites it to i∗1. However, for such attack model there exists an
attack-resilient supervisor for the plant, modeled as an FST S
presented in Figure 7d. It counters the attacks by revising i1
back to i2 every other step.
As illustrated in the above example, the problem is that if
the sensors are corrupted by the attacker As, the supervisor S
0
i1, i2|i2
(a) Plant P
0
i2|i1
(b) Attacker As
0 1
i1
i2
(c) Model of the desired
language K
0 1
i1|i1
i1|i2
(d) Supervisor S
Fig. 7: Example of sensor attacks that can only be countered
by FST-based supervisors.
will need the ability to change it back. But, when modeled by
an automaton, the supervisor can only enable or disable events.
This is insufficient to counter the attack and provide resiliency
against such attacks. Therefore, in this work, we consider the
use FSTs to model supervisors. Modeling supervisors as FSTs
instead of automata provides them the extra ability to revise
symbols that are required to counter attacks on the plant’s
sensors, as shown in Example 6.
Now, when we consider the problem of controllability under
attack, in the rest of the section, we make the following
assumption on the sensor attack model As.
Assumption 1. The attacker As can (i) accept and (ii) only
accept words that are generated by the plant P , i.e.,
Lin(As) = Lout(P).
The first part of Assumption 1 means that the attacker As
is well-defined for any acceptable word of the plant P . Oth-
erwise, an error will occur when As receives an unacceptable
input. The second part of Assumption 1 is always achievable
by trimming the attacker As.
Intuitively, to supervise the plant under sensor attacks while
ensuring attack-resiliency, the supervisor needs to (i) recover
the possible output of the plant, (ii) recover the possible input
of the plant, and (iii) constrain the input to the plant. The task
(i) is performed by taking the inversion of the attack model
described as an FST; note that the attack model may capture
a wide range of actions as it may be overly conservative
to assume a specific (e.g., deterministic) attack mapping.
Similarly, the task (ii) is achievable by taking the inversion
of the plant.
Inversion: A normalized FST A = (S, sinit, I,O,
Trans,Sfinal) is inversed to A−1 = (S, sinit,O, I,Trans,Sfinal)
by flipping the input and output symbol on each transition, as
presented in Algorithm 2.
Note that Algorithm 2 provides an FST realization for inver-
sion of regular relations RA−1 = R−1A , and shows the close-
ness of regular relations under inversion. We now introduce the
following lemma that follows immediately from Algorithm 2.
Lemma 1. For any FST A, the composed regular relations
RA−1◦A and RA◦A−1 contains the identity relation, i.e.,
RMLin(A) ⊆ RA◦A−1 , RMLout(A) ⊆ RA−1◦A.
8Algorithm 2 Normalized FST Inversion
Require: Normalized FST A = (S, sinit, I,O,Trans,Sfinal)
1: Let A−1 = (S, sinit,O, I, ∅,Sfinal).
2: for (s, I, O, s′) ∈ Trans and |I| > 1 do
3: Add transition (s, O, I, s′) to A−1.
4: end for
5: return A−1
Algorithm 3 Design of a supervisor resilient to sensor attacks
Require: Desire language K , plant P , sensor attacker As.
1: Find MK realizing K ⊆ Lout(P) .
2: Compute composition P ◦ As .
3: Compute inversion (P ◦ As)−1 .
4: Compute composition S = (P ◦ As)−1 ◦MK .
5: return Supervisor S.
where MLin(A) and MLout(A) are FSAs (and thus also FSTs
by Remark 2) realizing the input and output languages Lin(A)
and Lout(A) of the FST A, respectively.
Returning to the resilient supervisory control problem, to
counter the attacker As, which may be nondeterministic,
and recover the possible input of the plant P , we construct
the inversion (P ◦ As)−1. For any input I , of the plant,
the corresponding output is P(I), and then the attacker As
rewrites it to a word in RP◦As(I). Thus, the inversion can
reverse it back to R(P◦As)◦(P◦As)−1(I), which is the set of
possible words passing through the plant and yielding the same
observation after attack as I . Restricting this set of words to
the desired language K guarantees the supervisory control
goal. Therefore, the supervisor S should be designed to be
(P ◦ As)−1 ◦ MK , where MK is the automaton realizing
the desired language K . This is summarized by Theorem 1
and Algorithm 3.
Theorem 1 (Controllability under sensor attack). In Figure 2
without Aa, the plant P is controllable to the desired regular
language K ⊆ Lout(P) under the attacker As on the plant’s
sensors. This can be achieved by the supervisor S = A−1s ◦
P−1 ◦MK .
Proof. It suffices to show the language passing the plant is
exactly K under the supervisor S = A−1s ◦ P−1 ◦ MK .
By construction, the supervisor only generates words con-
tained in K . On the other hand, for any I ∈ K , noting
that by Lemma 1, I ∈ R(P◦As)◦(P◦As)−1(I), we know
I ∈ RP◦As◦S(I), i.e., the word I is allowed to transmit to
the plant.
Theorem 1 provides a computational method to design
supervisor, which we introduce in Algorithm 3.
Example 7 (Supervisor design under sensor attacks). Let us
revisit Example 6 and the system from Figure 2 with only As
(and no Aa). Attack-resilient supervisor S in Figure 7d can
be derived by the serial composition of the inversion of the
attacker As in Figure 7b and the model of desired language
K in Figure 7c – i.e., S = (P ◦ As)−1 ◦MK .
Algorithm 4 Construction of an FST Filter for the Desired
Language K
Require: Desire language K , plant P .
1: Find automata M and M′ with L(M) = Lout(P) and
L(M′) = K .
2: Convert M and M′ to FSTs by adding ε as output and
input symbol for each transition, respectively.
3: A =M◦M′.
4: Trim off transitions with output symbol ε in A.
5: return Supervisor A.
VI. CONTROLLABILITY UNDER ACTUATOR ATTACKS
In this section, we study the supervisory control problem un-
der only actuator attacks for deterministic plants. We consider
the setup from Figure 2 without As – the actuators of the plant
P are under the attack modeled with Aa, but the supervisor
S has direct access to the sensing symbols (words) coming
from the plant. Note that this problem is more complex then
the resilient supervisory control problem with sensor attacks
studied in Section V, as the control words of the supervisor
are not directly sent to the plant. Consequently, the desired
language may not be controllable to the plant for different
attack models. For example, if the attacks Aa generates the
empty word ε upon all inputs, capturing Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks, then the only controllable desired language for
the plant is {ε}.
In the rest of the section, we make the following assumption
on the actuator attacks Aa.
Assumption 2. The attacker Aa can (i) generate and
(ii) only generate words that are acceptable to the plant P ,
i.e., Lout(Aa) = Lin(P).
Similarly to the case of attacks on sensors, the first part
of Assumption 2 means that the actuator attacks Aa will not
cause an error by sending an unacceptable input of the plant
P , as such attacks are easy to detect. The way the attacker tries
to interfere with the control goal is to inject an undesired word
in Lin(P)\K to the plant. The second part of Assumption 2
ensures that every word in LI(P) may possibly be sent to the
plant P .
For attack-resilient supervision of the plant under sensor
attacks, the supervisor S needs to (i) recover the possible input
word of the plant P from its output, (ii) constrain the possible
word within the desired language, and (iii) rewrite these words
to counter the effects of the actuator attacks Aa. The task (i)
is achievable by the inversion P−1 of the plant.
Filter: Unlike the approach introduced in Section V, in this
case task (ii) is achieved by an FST filter MK of the desired
language K ∈ Lin(P). This is because an automaton of K
cannot handle input words in Lin(P)\K . The filter takes a
word I ∈ Lin(P) and sends the same word if I ∈ K , and ε
otherwise. To achieve this we introduce Algorithm 4.
Finally, for the task (iii), we construct the inversion A−1a of
the actuator attack model. Consequently, the supervisor is
S = P−1 ◦MK ◦ A−1a . (5)
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the plant, the inversion RP−1(I) recovers the corresponding
possible inputs of the plant. Then the filter MK constraints
them to RP−1◦MK (I) ⊆ K . Finally, the inversion A−1a
rewrites them to RP−1◦MK ◦A−1a (I) to counter the actuator
attacks modeled by the FST A−1a .
By construction, only the words I ′ ∈ K can pass the
filter MK . But, noting that RA−1a ◦Aa(K ) is not necessarily
contained in K , the input language of the plant may not
be exactly K ; instead, the supervisor S from (5) may only
restrict the language passing the plant to a minimal superset
of K . The desired language K is controllable, when the
containment holds. This is equivalent to checking if K is
contained in the output language of MK ◦ A−1a ◦ Aa.
This is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Controllability under actuator attacks). Consider
the setup from Figure 2 without As. The plant P is weakly
controllable to the desired regular language K ⊆ Lin(P)
under the actuator attack Aa by the supervisor S = P−1 ◦
MK ◦A−1a . Furthermore, the minimal controllable language
containing K is
K˜ = RA−1a ◦Aa(K ). (6)
The desired language is controllable if and only if K˜ = K ,
or equivalently the output language ofMK ◦A−1a ◦Aa satisfies
Lout(MK ◦ A−1a ◦ Aa) ⊆ K . (7)
Proof. Sufficiency: It suffices to show that the language pass-
ing to the plant is exactly K under the supervisor S =
P−1 ◦MK ◦A−1a . By (7), we have Lout(S ◦Aa) ⊆ K , thus
the plant only receives words in K . On the other hand, for
any I ∈ K , noting that I ∈ RA−1a ◦Aa(I) and I ∈ RP◦P−1(I)
by Lemma 1, we have
I ∈ RP◦S◦Aa(I) = RP◦P−1◦MK ◦A−1a ◦Aa(I),
namely, the word I is allowed to be transmitted to the plant.
Necessity: It suffices to show the minimality of K˜ in (6).
Suppose there exists a supervisor S that can weakly control
the plant to K ′ such that
K ⊆ K ′ ⊆ K˜ . (8)
Then for any I ′ ∈ K ′, there exists an output word of the
supervisor I such that I ∈ R−1Aa(I ′). Consequently, any word
in Aa(I) can be transmitted to the plant, i.e., Aa(I) ⊆ K ′.
Namely,
A−1a ◦ Aa(K ′) ⊆ K ′ (9)
Combining (6),(8), and (9), it follows that
K˜ = A−1a ◦ Aa(K ) ⊆ A−1a ◦ Aa(K ′) ⊆ K ′.
This implies that K ′ = K˜ .
Theorem 2 provides a computational method to design such
supervisor, as provided in Algorithm 5.
Example 8 (Supervisor design for actuator attacker). Follow-
ing the configuration from Figure 2 without As, consider a set
Algorithm 5 Design of a supervisor resilient to actuator at-
tacks
Require: Desired language K , plant P , model of actuator
attacks Aa.
1: Find FST filter MK for K .
2: Compute inversions A−1a , P−1 .
3: Compute serial composition S = P−1 ◦MK ◦ A−1a .
4: if the output language Lout(MK ◦A−1a ◦Aa) ⊆ K then
5: return K is controllable.
6: else
7: return K is not controllable.
8: end if
9: return Supervisor S.
0
i1|i1
i2|i2
(a) Plant.
0 1 2
i1|i1
i2|i2
i1|ε
i2|i2
i1, i2|ε
(b) Filter of Desired language K .
0 1
i1|i1
i1|i2
i1|i1
i2|i2
(c) Actuator Attacker I.
0 1 2
i1|i1
i2|i1
i2|i2
(d) Supervisor I.
0
i1, i2|i1, i2
(e) Actuator Attacker II.
0 1 2
i1|i1, i2
i2|i1, i2
i2|i1, i2
i2|i1, i2
(f) Supervisor II.
Fig. 8: Example supervisors for actuator attacks.
of symbols I = {i1, i2} and a plant P accepting the language
(i1, i2)
∗, as shown in Figure 8a. The (prefix-closed) desired
language is K = (i1, i2)i2, associated with the FST filter
MK (Figure 8b). Now consider the following two cases.
Controllable: The attacker AI on the input of the plant
is represented by an FST shown in Figure 8c. It rewrites the
first i1 nondeterministically to i1 or i2. The output language
Lout(S ◦ AI) = (i1, i2)i2 is exactly K . Thus, the plant is
controllable to K by the supervisor S even under the attack.
Weakly Controllable: The attacker AI on the input of
the plant is represented by an FST from Figure 8e. It rewrites
any i1 nondeterministically to i1 or i2. It sends first i1 and
then i1 or i2 upon receiving i2. The output language Lout(S ◦
AI) = (i1, i2)(i1, i2) is larger than K . Therefore, the plant
is uncontrollable to K by the supervisor S. It is easy to see
that (i1, i2)(i1, i2) is a minimal superset of K .
Remark 4. Note that the supervisor in Figure 8f, derived
in Example 8, is nondeterministic, corresponding to multiple
allowable controls. For example, the supervisor at the state 0
can either send i1 or i2 upon receiving i1. The controllability
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theorem guarantees that in the presence of attacks, the union
of all possible words received by the plant under all these
allowable controls is exactly the desired language K . In im-
plementation, the nondeterminism can be resolved by choosing
one of the allowable controls. Accordingly, the possible words
received by the plant is contained in K . An avenue for future
work is to resolve the nondeterminism optimally when there
are different costs for the supervisor to revise the control
symbols.
VII. CONTROLLABILITY UNDER BOTH SENSOR AND
ACTUATOR ATTACKS
In this section, we study the supervisory control problem
under both sensor and actuator attacks for deterministic plants,
as shown in Figure 2. This is a combination of the supervisory
control problems studied in Sections V and VI. In the rest of
the section, we assume that the actuator attacker Aa and the
sensor attacker As are well-defined as captured in Assump-
tions 1 and 2.
From Section VI, it follows that the FST P−1 ◦MK ◦A−1a
can constrain the input of the plant P , and revise these words
to counter the actuator attacks modeled by Aa. Here, MK is
a filter. This, in combination with the analysis in Section V,
implies that the supervisor A−1s ◦ P−1 ◦ MK ◦ A−1a can
additionally counter the sensor attacks As. It is easy to check
that K ⊆ RP◦As◦S◦Aa(K ). However, RP◦As◦S◦Aa(K )
is not necessarily contained in K . The supervisor S =
A−1s ◦P−1◦MK ◦A−1a only restricts the language passing the
plant to a minimal superset of K . The desired language K is
controllable, when the containment holds. This is summarized
by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Controllability under actuator and sensor attacks).
In Figure 2, the plant P is weakly controllable to the desired
regular language K ⊆ Lin(P) under the attacks Aa and
As on its input and output, respectively, by the supervisor
S = A−1s ◦ P−1 ◦ MK ◦ A−1a . Furthermore, the minimal
controllable language containing K is
K˜ = RA−1a ◦Aa(K ). (10)
The desired language is controllable if and only if K˜ = K ,
or equivalently the output language ofMK ◦A−1a ◦Aa satisfies
Lout(MK ◦ A−1a ◦ Aa) ⊆ K . (11)
Proof. Necessity: Same as the proof for necessity for Theo-
rem 2.
Sufficiency: It suffices to show that the language passing the
plant is exactly K under the supervisor S = A−1s ◦MK ◦
A−1a . By (11), we have that
Lout(S ◦ Aa) ⊆ Lout(MK ◦ A−1a ◦ Aa) ⊆ K ,
namely, the plant only receives words in K . On the other
hand, for any I ∈ K , noting that I ∈ RA−1a ◦Aa(I) and I ∈R(P◦As)◦(P◦As)−1(I), it follows that
I ∈ RAs◦S◦Aa(I) = RP◦As◦(P◦As)−1◦MK ◦A−1a ◦Aa(I),
namely, the word I is allowed to transmit to the plant.
Algorithm 6 Design supervisor under both actuator and sensor
attacks
Require: Plant P , actuator attacker Aa, sensor attacker As,
desired language K .
1: Find a model MK of K .
2: Compute inversion A−1a , P−1 and A−1s .
3: Compute composition S = A−1s ◦ P−1 ◦MK ◦ A−1a .
4: if the output language Lout(MK ◦A−1a ◦Aa) ⊆ K then
5: return K is controllable
6: else
7: return K is not controllable
8: end if
9: return Supervisor S.
As illustrated by the statement and proof of Theorem 3, the
design of supervisor can be performed by separately taking
into accounts the actuator and sensor attacks, and the sensor
attacks, modeled by As, have no influence on the controllabil-
ity. This result is different from most previous works [4, 6, 35].
This is because the supervisor when modeled by an FST,
and not an automaton, has more power in generating control
words by itself, and depends much less on the input word
it receives. By adding a component A−1s , the effect of the
sensor attacker As is totally countered, as is summarized by
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For deterministic plants, the sensor attacker As
has no influence on the controllability of a desired language
in the supervisor control problem shown in Figure 2.
Theorem 3 also provides a computational method to design
such supervisor, as given in Algorithm 6.
Example 9 (Supervisor design for resiliency under both
sensor and actuator attacks). Following Example 8 and the
configuration in Figure 2, consider a set of symbols I =
{i1, i2} and a plant P accepting the language (i1, i2)∗, as
shown in Figure 8a. The (prefix-closed) desired language is
K = (i1, i2)i2, represented by an automaton MK as shown
in Figure 9a. Now, let us consider the following two cases.
Controllable: The attackers Aa and As on the sensors
and actuators of the plant are modeled by FSTs from Fig-
ures 8c and 9b, respectively. The actuator attacker rewrites
the first i1 nondeterministically to i1 or i2. The sensor attacker
removes i2 and replaces i1 with i2. The supervisor shown
in Figure 9c does not contain any transition with input label i1,
as it will never appear due to the attack. The output language
Lout(As ◦ S ◦Aa) = (i1, i2)i2 is equal to K . Thus, the plant
is controllable to K by the supervisor S .
Weakly Controllable: The attackers Aa and As are
modeled by FSTs from Figures 8e and 9d, respectively. The
actuator attacker rewrites i1 nondeterministically to i1 or
i2. The sensor attacker replaces i1 with i2. The supervisor
does not contain any transition with input label i1, as it will
never appear. Obviously, the output language (i1, i2)(i1, i2)
minimally contains K .
Comparing to Example 8, adding a sensor attacker has no
influence on the controllability. This agrees with Corollary 1.
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0 1 2
i1
i2 i2
(a) Desired language K
0
i1|i2
i2|ε
(b) Sensor Attacker I
0 1 2
i2|i1
ε|i1
ε|i2
(c) Supervisor I
0
i1, i2|i2
(d) Sensor Attacker II
0 1 2
i2|i1, i2 i2|i1, i2
(e) Supervisor II
Fig. 9: Example supervisors for sensor and actuator attacks.
Remark 5. Recalling Remark 3, more controllable languages
can be achieved here than previous works [35, 32, 4, 6], as
more powerful supervisors that can revise symbols are used.
The only exception is that Theorem 2 reduces to the standard
controllability theorem KIc ∩ Lin(P) = K in [6], since in
this case, the supervisor does not revise.
Finally, we note that if the second part of Assumption 2
is violated, i.e., Lout(Aa) ⊆ Lin(P), Theorems 2 and 3 still
hold on the trimmed plant accepting Lout(Aa).
Remark 6. For Theorems 2 and 3, in the case of Lout(Aa) ⊆
Lin(P), it is easy to show that K˜ = A−1a ◦ Aa(K ) is the
minimal controllable language containing K ∩Lout(Aa), and
K is controllable if Lout(MK ◦A−1a ◦Aa) ⊆ K and K ⊆
Lout(Aa).
VIII. CONTROLLABILITY FOR SYSTEMS WITH
NONDETERMINISTIC PLANTS
In this section, we extend the attack-resilient controllabil-
ity theorems and supervisor synthesizing algorithms derived
in Sections V to VII to systems with nondeterministic plants
that are nonblocking, as formally stated in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Nonblocking). The plant P = (S, sinit, I,O,
Trans,Sfinal) is nonblocking for the regular relation R ⊆ RP
if for any (I,O) ∈ R and K ∈ Lin(P),
∃s ∈ Reach(I,O)(sinit),Trans(s, i, ·, ·) 6= ∅
=⇒ ∀s ∈ Reach(I,O)(sinit),Trans(s, i, ·, ·) 6= ∅;
namely, if a symbol i is accepted by some s in the reachable
set Reach(I,O)(sinit) of an acceptable pair of input and output
words (I,O) to the plant, then this symbol should be accepted
by any state in the reachable set.
This property ensures that regardless of the nondeterministic
past executions taken by the plant that corresponds to observed
inputs and outputs, the next accepting symbol can always
be executed. It rules out the situation in Figure 3 where the
execution of the second input symbol i2 or i3 depends on the
nondeterministic execution for the first input/output symbols
i1|i3. Specially, a deterministic plant is nonblocking as there
is only one execution corresponding to any accepting input.
The nonblocking property of a nondeterministic FST can
be checked via the well-known powerset construction. Specif-
ically, we treat P as a nondeterministic automaton as discussed
in Remark 2 and determinize it by the powerset construction to
Algorithm 7 Check nonblocking for nondeterministic plants
Require: Plant P , regular relation R
1: Compute determinization PD by (12).
2: Find automaton model MR and compute composition
MR ◦ PD.
3: if (13) holds for all transitions in TransD then
4: return P is nonblocking.
5: else
6: return P is blocking.
7: end if
PD = (SD, {sinit}, ID,TransD,SDfinal) where SD,SDfinal ⊆ 2S,
ID = (I ∪ {ε})× (O ∪ {ε})\{(ε, ε)} and
TransD =
{(
S1, (i, o),S2
)|S1 ⊆ S, (i, o) ∈ ID,
S2 = ∪s∈S1
(
Trans(s, i, o, ·) ∪ Trans(s, ε, ε, ·))}. (12)
Now, the nonblocking property of P can be checked on PD
as captured by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Checking Nonblocking). The plant P is nonblock-
ing for the regular relation R ⊆ RP if and only if for any
execution
({sinit}, (i1, o1),S1) . . . (Sn−1, (in, on),Sn) of PD
with (i1 . . . in, o1 . . . on) ∈ R, we have for i ∈ [n] that
Sn = ∩s∈Sn−1Trans(s, in, on, ·). (13)
Proof. First, we note that the determinized automaton PD is
free from ε-moves, because all its states are closed under the
ε-moves of P . By construction, PD and P accept the same
regular language/relation, and the states of PD correspond
to the reachable sets of P . Thus, combining (13) and (12)
gives Definition 3, and vice versa.
Let MR be an automaton model for the regular rela-
tion R treated as a regular language, then the composition
MR ◦PD restricts the determinized automaton PD to its sub-
language R. This fact and Lemma 2 lead to Algorithm 7.
The controllability theorems and supervisor synthesizing al-
gorithms extend from deterministic plants to nondeterministic
plants, if and only if the control words of the supervisor can be
executed without blocking for the composition of the rest of
the closed-loop system. This immediately leads to Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Theorems 1 to 3 and Algorithms 3, 5 and 6 are
valid for plants modeled by nondeterministic FSTs, if and only
if the composed FSTs P◦As, Aa◦P and Aa◦P ◦As are non-
blocking for the regular relation induced by the supervisor S ,
respectively.
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m n |SMK | Time (ms) Memory (MB)
9 2 102 15.566 0.20944
9 3 103 16.309 2.1642
99 2 104 20.852 47.563
9 5 105 99.535 340.26
99 3 106 721.68 7106.7
TABLE I: Execution time and memory usage of the supervi-
sory synthesizing algorithm for different values of n and m.
Finally, note that when plant P is deterministic, the com-
posed FSTs P ◦As, Aa ◦P and Aa ◦P ◦As are deterministic
and satisfy (13). Unlike in case with deterministic plants, sen-
sor attacks can influence the controllability of nondeterministic
plants by blocking the control words of the supervisor.
IX. ARSC TOOL AND SYNTHESIS SCALABILITY
Based on the proposed algorithms for synthesis of Attack-
Resilient Supervisory Controllers we developed an open-
source tool ARSC, available at [1]; the tool exploits OpenFst
libraries [2]. In this section, we illustrate its efficiency on
problems on different scales. For all evaluations, the tool was
executed on an Intel Core i7-7700K CPU, and the execution
time and memory usage were measured.
To illustrate effectiveness of our approach, we consider a
scheduling problem from [6], where n players independently
requiring service for m sequential tasks tij , i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
on a central server. The tasks of each player have to be
served in the index order. The sensors are corrupted by an
attacker that removes the tasks performed by the first player;
and the actuator attacks nondeterministically rotate the input
sequence t1jt2j . . . t(n−1)jtnj to t2jt3j . . . tnjt1j for any task
index j ∈ [m]. For n = 2,m = 2, the desired language K
for the system, as well as the attacks are modeled as shown in
Figure 10. From Theorem 3, the language K is controllable
and the attacks can be countered by the supervisor constructed
by Algorithm 6. The supervisor for the case n = 2,m = 2 is
displayed in Figure 10e.
The complexity of the supervisor synthesis algorithms is de-
termined by the complexity of the composition operation. The
composition A1 ◦A2 requires O(|SA1 ||SA2 |DA1(log(DA2) +
MA2)) time and O(|SA1 ||SA2 |DA1MA2) space where |S·|, D·
and M· denote the number of states, the maximum out-degree
and the maximum multiplicity for the FST, respectively [2].
The order in which the composition operations are performed
can also change the overall complexity. For simplicity, the term
P−1 is dropped and the supervisor is computed as (A−1s ◦
MK ) ◦ A−1a in our implementation. Therefore, the overall
time complexity is reduced to O(|SMK ||SAa |DAs log(DAa))
where SMK ∼ O((m+1)n) and SAa=DAs=DAa ∼ O(mn)
for this problem.
Table I shows the running times of the algorithm averaged
over 100 synthesis and the maximum amount of memory used
during the tool execution for different values of n and m. We
can observe that a tenfold increase in the number of states in
MK increases the execution time and the memory usage by at
most 100 times. This sub-quadratic increase is a consequence
of the composition operations performed by the algorithm.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have studied the problem of supervisory
control of discrete-event plants in the presence of attacks on
the plant’s sensors and actuators. We have considered a very
general class of attacks that have the ability to nondetermin-
istically rewrite a word to any word of a regular language,
and proposed to model them by FSTs that possess a li-
brary of mathematically rigorous and computationally feasible
operations, such as inversion and composition. Furthermore,
we have onsidered a general supervisor model where the
supervisors are also captured by FSTs.
We have first focused on the attack-resilient supervisory
control problem for deterministic plants in three setups where
attacks occur on the plant’s: (i) sensors, (ii) actuators, and
(iii) both actuators and sensors; we have introduced new sets
of controllability theorems and synthesis algorithms for attack-
resilient supervisors. We have shown that for (i), the attacks on
sensors can be countered by a supervisor derived by the serial
composition of the inversion of the attacker and a model of the
desired language; for (ii), the attacks on actuators can be partly
countered by a supervisor derived by the serial composition
of a model of the desired language and the inversion of the
attacker; and for (iii), a supervisor can be derived by serially
composing the supervisors in the cases (i) and (ii). The above
results have been also extended to nondeterministic plants
with the nonblocking conditions. Finally, we have introduced
a tool for synthesis of such attack-resilient supervisors and
demonstrated its scalability. An avenue for future work is to
resolve the nondeterminism optimally when there are different
costs for the supervisor to revise the control symbols.
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